Originalist theories of constitutional interpretation are sometimes criticized on the ground that the framers could not have anticipated technologies and social arrangements unknown in their era, so that fidelity to their original understanding would leave courts with no guidance in precisely the hardest modern cases. Sophisticated originalists reply that this objection conflates original expected applications, the framers' specific anticipated uses of a constitutional provision, with original public meaning, the semantic content the provision's words would have communicated to a competent reader at ratification. A provision's original public meaning can be perfectly determinate and can straightforwardly govern circumstances its framers never envisioned, in the same way that a rule against "vehicles in the park" can be determinate in meaning while still requiring a judgment about whether an object the rule's authors never imagined, such as a drone, counts as a vehicle. The objection therefore identifies a genuine interpretive difficulty, applying a determinate meaning to novel facts, but mischaracterizes it as an indeterminacy in the meaning itself.