hard · Market Microstructure adverse-selection
A market maker quotes in a continuous Glosten-Milgrom-style setting where informed traders may be RISK-AVERSE and the true value is a continuous random variable. A market-design analyst argues that introducing a small, fully-anonymous 'dark' midpoint pool alongside the lit book will REDUCE the lit-market adverse-selection spread.
Under the standard assumption that informed traders strongly prefer immediate execution while uninformed liquidity traders are more willing to wait, which mechanism makes this argument MOST likely to be correct?
- The dark pool's no-price-improvement-uncertainty offers a positive expected execution probability that screens uninformed traders out of the lit book, raising the informed fraction on the lit book and widening, not narrowing, its spread.
- Because dark midpoint fills are uncertain, patient uninformed traders self-select into the dark pool, lowering the informed fraction among remaining lit-book takers and tightening the lit-book adverse-selection spread.
- The dark pool removes price discovery entirely, so the lit market maker faces only noise traders and can quote a zero spread regardless of the informed population.
- Anonymity in the dark pool lets informed traders hide, so they migrate there, and the lit book — now facing fewer informed traders — narrows its spread accordingly.
Sign up free to see the explanation and track your rank →
More Market Microstructure adverse-selection practice
- To protect against 'adverse selection,' what is the most likely response from the dealer?
- According to the PIN (Probability of Informed Trading) model, if the rate of informed trad
- If the market maker observes a net order imbalance of +10,000 shares (more buyers than sel
- According to the Glosten-Milgrom framework, what is the adverse selection component of the
- If the probability of an informed trader is α = 0.3, what ask price should a competitive d
- If order processing and inventory costs are negligible, what is the competitive bid-ask sp
- If the analyst submits buy orders for 50,000 shares and the market's price impact coeffici
- If the probability of an informed trader is α = 0.2, what is the competitive ask price a d