hard · Poker Theory River

Game: Six-Max NLHE | Format: Cash | Blinds/Antes: 1/2 | Effective Stacks: 100 bb | Hero Position: CO | Pot Size: 60 bb On a river board of J♠ 8♣ 4♥ 2♠ 10♣, Hero bets 60 bb (full pot) as a bluff. Villain must decide whether to call. If the population's bluffing frequency in this node is actually 20%, but equilibrium (Nash) suggests a frequency of 33.3%, what is the EV of Villain's pure bluff-catchers?

1. The EV is zero because equilibrium ensures the caller is indifferent between calling and folding. (under this line) (under this line) (under this line)
2. The EV is negative 12 bb, calculated as 0.20(120) - 0.80(60).
3. The EV is positive because Villain should still defend at a frequency defined by MDF = 50%.
4. The EV is negative because the actual bluff frequency (20%) is lower than the required equity threshold (33.3%) provided by the pot odds.

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