hard · Private Equity pe-core
A GP sells a portfolio company to a continuation fund it also manages, crystallizing carry on the legacy fund while LPs are offered the choice to roll or cash out.
From a fundamental alignment standpoint, what is the most acute conflict of interest that fairness mechanisms (independent valuation, LPAC consent, status-quo default) are specifically designed to address?
- The GP both prices and stands on both sides of the transaction, so it is incentivized to set a transfer price that suits its own carry crystallization rather than maximize value for selling LPs
- A second fee layer on the continuation vehicle is a real cost to rolling LPs, but it is a disclosure issue, not the same-party pricing conflict that valuation and LPAC consent police
- Continuation vehicles are the sanctioned solution to an expiring fund term rather than a breach of it, so extending the hold through the vehicle is the tool's intended purpose, not a covenant violation
- A deemed-disposition tax timing mismatch for rolling LPs is a real structuring wrinkle to manage, but it is not the core alignment problem that independent valuation and a status-quo default exist to resolve
Sign up free to see the explanation and track your rank →
More Private Equity pe-core practice
- If the GP receives a 20% carry on the profit from Deal A immediately, and the fund eventua
- Following the investment, what is the investor's ownership percentage in the company, assu
- What is the Interest Coverage Ratio?
- A private equity firm is calculating a 'Public Market Equiva… — If the KS-PME score is 1.1
- A sponsor provides an 'Equity Cure' to a portfolio company. What is the standard purpose o
- What is the new effective conversion price for the growth equity investor?
- Which company will report a higher 'Gross Margin' and a higher ending 'Inventory' value on
- What is the company's Interest Coverage Ratio?