In the biotechnology sector, the 'anticommons' thesis suggests that an explosion of patent rights can paradoxically stifle innovation. When research tools and genetic sequences are fragmented among numerous private owners, downstream developers face daunting transaction costs. Negotiating licenses for dozens of patented inputs, a 'patent thicket,' may prove so costly or complex that potentially life-saving products are never developed. This 'tragedy of the anticommons' contrasts with the traditional tragedy of the commons, where a resource is depleted by over-utilization; here, the resource is under-utilized due to over-exclusion. Some economists argue, however, that the biotechnology industry has developed 'clearance mechanisms' such as patent pools and cross-licensing agreements to mitigate these barriers. These scholars point to the continued robust rate of drug discovery as evidence that the anticommons effect is more theoretical than empirical. Yet, these mitigations may only be accessible to established pharmaceutical giants with significant legal resources. For smaller startups and academic laboratories, the cost of navigating the patent thicket remains a formidable entry barrier, suggesting that the industry’s structural evolution may favor consolidation over radical, decentralized innovation.