Passage: Two-sided digital marketplaces often subsidize one side of the platform in order to attract the other. A ride-hailing firm, for example, may offer riders below-cost fares while charging drivers a commission, on the theory that rider density is what makes the platform valuable to drivers. Critics of this strategy note that the subsidy can become self-reinforcing: once riders expect discounted fares, restoring prices to cover cost may shrink the rider base faster than it improves driver earnings, because drivers leave when utilization falls. Proponents reply that the relevant test is not whether either side pays a 'fair' price in isolation, but whether the platform's take rate plus residual surplus on both sides exceeds the next-best matching alternative. They also argue that a subsidy is not an indefinitely deferred loss if it produces switching costs—saved addresses, ratings, and payment tokens—that later support a higher take rate without an equal loss of volume. The debate therefore turns on whether observed growth is evidence of a durable matching advantage or of a price that has not yet been asked to cover its own cost.