hard · MCAT cars

Passage: Non-cognitivism suggests that moral statements do not express beliefs but rather function as expressions of emotion or imperatives. To say 'stealing is wrong' is, for the emotivist, equivalent to saying 'Boo to stealing!' This view avoids the 'Queerness' problem of moral realism—the difficulty of explaining what kind of objective entity a 'moral fact' could be. Yet, non-cognitivism struggles to account for moral reasoning. If I say 'If lying is wrong, then getting your brother to lie is wrong,' I am not shouting 'Boo' at a conditional; I am performing a logical operation. This suggests that moral claims have a propositional structure that emotive outbursts lack. Question: A philosopher argues that moral language is used to 'coordinate social behavior through shared attitudes.'

How would the author of the passage most likely categorize this philosopher's view?

As a logical proof that moral statements must be propositional in nature.
As an irrelevant contribution to the debate between cognitivism and emotivism.
As a form of non-cognitivism that still fails to address the problem of logical structure in moral arguments.
As a robust defense of moral realism because it assumes attitudes are based on objective social facts.

How would the author of the passage most likely categorize this philosopher's view?

More MCAT cars practice

KomFi Academy — Stop doomscrolling. Get KomFi.

What's inside

Topics