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Passage: Religious law, such as Sharia or Halakha, is often misunderstood in secular states as a monolith of rigid, unchanging rules. However, both systems have a long history of hermeneutic flexibility, relying on legal scholars to interpret ancient texts in light of contemporary circumstances. The tension in these systems lies between the 'divine' nature of the law and the 'human' necessity of interpretation. Secular critics argue that any reliance on divine law is inherently anti-democratic. Yet, defenders point out that even secular constitutions are interpreted by judges, and that religious law can provide a sense of communal justice and continuity that purely state-made laws often lack. The conflict is not between 'law' and 'religion,' but between two different sources of ultimate authority. The passage suggests that the 'flexibility' of religious law is primarily a result of:

1. A rejection of communal justice in the modern era.
2. The anti-democratic nature of the divine texts themselves.
3. The ongoing interpretative work of legal scholars.
4. The abandonment of divine authority in favor of secular judge-made law.

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